


Toward an Atlas of the Physical Internet

Summer 2014



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Computer Sciences
University of Wisconsin

Motivation



THE ARPA NETWORK

DEC 1969

4 NODES





FIGURE 6.2 Drawing of 4 Node Network
(Courtesy of Alex McKenzie)

Objectives of our work

- **Create and maintain a comprehensive catalog of the *physical Internet***
 - Geographic locations of nodes (buildings that house PoPs, IXPs etc.) and links (fiber conduits)
- **Extend with relevant related data**
 - Active probes, BGP updates, weather, etc.
- **Maintain portal for visualization and analysis**
- **Apply maps to problems of interest**
 - Robustness, performance, security


Related work

- **Many prior Internet mapping efforts**
 - S. Gorman studies from early 2000's
 - CAIDA
 - DIMES
 - iPlane
- **Commercial activities**
 - TeleGeography
 - Renesys/Dyn
 - Lumeta
- **Internet Topology Zoo**


Compiling a physical repository

- **Step #1: Identification**
 - Utilize *search* to find maps of physical locations
- **Step #2: Transcription**
 - Multiple methods to automate data entry
- **Step #3: Verification**
 - Ensure that data reflects latest network maps
- **Our hypothesis is that physical sites are limited in number and fixed in location**
 - But the raw number is still large!


Example: Telstra world wide



Example: Sprint IP network (US)



Example: Regional fiber



Illinois POP List

ALTON

Address: 1805 Washington Ave Zip: 62002
 Type: CO Status: FUTURE
 CLI: ALTNILAK

BELLEVILLE

Address: 211 Kretschmer Ave Zip: 62220
 Type: CO Status: ACTIVE
 CLI: BLVLILAD

BLOOMINGTON

Address: 110 E Monroe St Zip: 61701
 Type: CO Status: ACTIVE
 CLI: BLTNILXD

Address: 110 E Monroe St Zip: 61701
 Type: CO Status: DOUBLE
 CLI: BLTNILXD

CAIRO

Address: 221 15th St Zip: 62914
 Type: CO Status: ACTIVE
 CLI: CAIRILCF

CANTON

Address: 75 W Pine St Zip: 61520
 Type: CO Status: ACTIVE
 CLI: CNTNILCN

CARBONDALE

Address: 208 W Monroe St Zip: 62901
 Type: CO Status: ACTIVE
 CLI: CRDLILXE

CARMI

Address: 200 W Cherry St Zip: 62821


Internet Atlas @ UW

- **Effort began in September '11**
 - Capture everything from maps discovered by search
 - Use all relevant data sources (ISP maps, colocation, data centers, NTP, traceroute, etc.)
- **Data extraction and verification tools**
- **Comprehensive database**
- **Interactive web portal**
 - Includes ArcGIS for visualization and analysis
- **Paper in ACM SIGCOMM HotPlanet WS '13**

Current DB


- **Number of networks: 389**
- **Number of tier 1 networks: 10**
- **Number of data centers: 2,232**
- **Number of NTP servers: 744**
- **Number of traceroute servers: 221**
- **Number and type of other nodes: IXP (358), DNS root (282)**
- **Total number of nodes: 14,827**
- **Number of unique locations of nodes: 7,988**
- **Maximum overlap at any one node: 92**
- **Total number of links: 13,861**
- **Peering DB facility locations: 1058**
- **WiGLE Wireless SSID locations: 5202**
- **Antenna locations from FCC: 5786**

Internet Atlas – Full View



Case study: RiskRoute

Consider Internet physical infrastructure:




- **Can we automatically adjust routes to avoid outages before they happen?**
- **Can we identify the best backup routes?**

Bit-risk miles metric

- The idea of bit-miles motivates the introduction of *bit-risk miles*



- Consider a network path:



- The bit-risk miles of the routing path is defined as:

$$r_{i,j}(p) = \sum_{x=1}^K \left(d_{p_x, p_{x+1}} + \gamma_{i,j} \left(\lambda_h o_h(p_x) + \lambda_f o_f(p_x) \right) \right)$$

Bit miles
 Outage risk


Utility of bit-risk miles

- Quantifies the trade-offs between:

Short geographic routing paths with **high** outage risk

VS.

Long geographic routing paths with **low** outage risk



Defining terms

- **Gamma: what is the cost of an outage between the source and destination?**
 - To approximate this, we use the fraction of population affected clustered to nearest PoP
- **Lambda_h: what is historical outage probability at a PoP location?**
 - We use corpus of events from 1970 to 2010 (29,865 FEMA emergency declarations and over 145,000 NOAA severe weather events)
- **Lambda_f: what is forecasted outage probability at a PoP location?**
 - Based on reported information from NWS, NHC, etc.



RiskRoute methodology

How do we choose which backup path has the smallest bit-risk miles?

- **Current techniques: Storing only one backup path (e.g., Fast Reroute) is fragile to large-scale outages**
- **Storing all the backup paths is combinatorial**
- **RiskRoute Framework: Using shortest path techniques, continuously recalculate all paths with the smallest bit-risk miles**

Analysis

- **Real-World Network**
 - 7 Tier-1 ISPs, 16 regional networks
- **Intra-domain Routing**
 - Routing inside a specified network
- **Inter-domain Routing**
 - Routing between networks
- **Performance Metrics:**



1

Risk Ratio – The average reduction in bit-risk miles using RiskRoute compared with shortest path routing

$$r_r = 1 - \frac{1}{N^2} \sum_{i=1}^N \sum_{j=1}^N \frac{r(\mathbf{P}_{i,j}^{rr})}{r(\mathbf{P}_{i,j}^{shortest})}$$

2

Distance Ratio – The average increase in bit-miles using RiskRoute compared with shortest path routing


$$d_r = \frac{1}{N^2} \sum_{i=1}^N \sum_{j=1}^N \frac{d(\mathbf{P}_{i,j}^{rr})}{d(\mathbf{P}_{i,j}^{shortest})} - 1$$

Intradomain results


- Why is RiskRoute more advantageous to some networks?

Reduction in Bit-Risk Miles (Risk Ratio)

Geographic footprint




Avg. router outdegree




Increase in Bit-Miles (Distance Ratio)

Number of PoPs




Number of peers




Robustness results

- Can all networks decrease risk via the new link infrastructure?



Hurricane Katrina and Level3



Next steps

- **Continue to populate DB**
 - Goal = 500 networks by December, '14
- **Continue to enhance web portal**
 - Expanded analytic capability
- **Add related data for physical sites**
 - PoPs, routers, IP addresses, peering, etc.
- **Expanded active probing capability**
 - IP geolocation is the key
- **Expand focus for target applications**
 - Shared infrastructure risk

Thank you!

- Ram Durairajan
- Brian Eriksson
- Xin Tang
- Subhadip Ghosh

Portal

<http://internetatlas.org>